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EXPLORING INFORMATION PRIVACY REGULATION,  
RISKS, TRUST, AND BEHAVIOR 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 Over the past few decades, governments worldwide have grappled with their 
approaches to regulating issues associated with information privacy.  However, research into 
individuals’ perceptions of regulatory protections and the relationships between those 
perceptions and behavioral choices has been sparse.   
 
 In this study, we develop and test a model that considers relationships between an 
antecedent variable (regulatory knowledge); a mediating structure that encompasses perceived 
privacy regulatory protection, trust, and privacy risk concerns; two outcome variables 
(protection behavior and regulatory preferences); and direct and moderating effects associated 
with perceived rewards.  Using a sample of young UK consumers that we collected in 
cooperation with the European Commission, we find strong support for our overall model and 
for most of our hypotheses. 
 
We discuss implications for research, managerial practice, and regulation. 
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1 
EXPLORING INFORMATION PRIVACY REGULATION,  
RISKS, TRUST, AND BEHAVIOR 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Beginning in the 1970s, attention worldwide has been focused on information privacy.  
By 1986, privacy had been denoted one of the four “ethical issues of the information age” 
[46].  As the years have passed, concerns about information privacy have only increased:  A 
2008 poll found that “72 percent of consumers are concerned that their online behavior [is] 
being tracked and profiled by companies” [18].  In a spring 2011 survey, 98 percent of 1,000 
smartphone users indicated that privacy was an important concern when using a mobile 
device, and over one third of them (38%) identified privacy as their top concern [32].  It is 
clear that consumers are worried about privacy. 
Over this same time frame – from the 1970s to today – governments around the world 
have grappled with their approaches to regulating issues associated with information privacy.  
Their approaches have differed greatly, however [27, 49, 69], and it is apparent that varying 
regulatory approaches to cross-border data flows are causing great consternation for firms that 
compete internationally (e.g., [39, 68]).  Examples of the tension abound:  for example, in 
mid-2014, the European Court of Justice ruled that Google must erase links to certain content 
about individual on the Web when those individuals request it [66], a ruling that many legal 
observers believe will have significant implications for many other firms that do business in 
Europe [78].  Ironically, it appears that consumer concerns associated with surveillance, 
reported extensively during 2013 and 2014 (see synthesis in [29]), are being directed more at 
commercial than governmental data interchanges [44].   
One tacit assumption on the part of governmental regulators seems to be that 
regulations impact behavior.  Ironically, in spite of the spike in international regulatory 
attention being devoted to privacy issues and the tensions associated therewith, there has been 
very little research associated with that relationship at either a corporate or an individual level.  
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At the corporate level, one must look back almost two decades to find a few studies (e.g., [70, 
73]).  At the individual level, as will be discussed in the next section, there have been eight 
studies to date, but none of those have considered a comprehensive model that addresses the 
complexity of individuals’ decision-making models.   
Therefore, in this paper, we describe a study that explores new and richer relationships 
than those studied in the previous works in this area.  Using a sample of young U.K. 
consumers that was gathered in cooperation with the European Commission, we test this 
model and find strong support for most hypotheses.   
This study makes three important contributions to the literature.   
First, the study is the first to construct a consolidated model that addresses a number 
of constructs related to governmental regulations and outcomes that had only been considered 
separately in previous studies. Those earlier works had, independently, identified some 
variables and relationships that may explain a number of perceptions, attitudes, and behavior 
associated with privacy regulation.  In this study, we go further by identifying components of 
the shared space in their analyses.   
Second, this paper provides empirical justification for relationships between several 
constructs that had heretofore been untested.  We have tested a model that considers 
relationships between an antecedent variable (regulatory knowledge); a mediating structure 
that encompasses perceived privacy regulation protection, trust, and privacy risk concerns; 
two outcome variables (protection behavior and regulatory preferences); and direct and 
moderating effects associated with perceived rewards.  It stands as the first offering to look 
across that spectrum of relationships by considering some selected variables within each 
domain associated with privacy regulation.    
Third, for four constructs that had been given only limited attention in prior research--
regulatory knowledge, privacy risk concerns, regulatory preferences, and perceived rewards—
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this study provides a starting set of measurement scales that can be used by future researchers 
as they delve more deeply into these constructs and their relationships.   
This paper proceeds as follows.  First, we provide background for the study by 
considering previous research.  Then, we develop our own research model and detail the 
hypotheses associated therewith.  We follow this with a discussion of the study’s method, and 
we detail our findings.  We then discuss implications of this study, not only for researchers 
but also for management and regulation.     
 
2. Background   
Our consideration of previous research in this domain reveals only eight studies that 
have examined, at the individual level, perceptions of or preferences for governmental privacy 
regulations (as either an independent or dependent variable) and their association with various 
constructs (perceptual and/or behavioral).  Table 1 details these eight studies.   
These studies have provided some insight into this phenomenon.  A number of 
important antecedents have been considered:  for example, cultural values [49, 51], previous 
experiences [58], and awareness of laws [25] have sometimes been included.  The manner in 
which regulatory attributes result in actions taken by individuals [25, 45, 82] and in 
determination of regulatory preferences have also been explored in some papers [40, 49].  
Additionally, several mediating and moderating variables have been included in various 
studies:  for example, demographic variables such as age, gender, and occupation [25, 40, 79, 
85] and individual attitudinal measures such as online privacy concerns [45, 82] have been 
incorporated into some models.  Thus, some forward movement has been observed in the 
research stream; at the same time, however, it is clear that these studies have not coalesced 
into a body of knowledge that can provide guidance to researchers, practitioners, managers, 
and regulators.   
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Therefore, to take one step towards a more cohesive knowledge base, we consider a 
model that looks across the framework called “APCO” (antecedents – privacy concerns – 
outcomes) by Smith et al. [71] by including both constructs inspired by some of the previous 
studies in Table 1 (regulatory knowledge, perceived privacy regulatory protection, privacy 
risk concerns, protection behavior, and regulatory preferences), a construct that has been 
considered frequently in the broader privacy domain but that has heretofore been overlooked 
in studies associated with regulation (trust), and a construct (perceived rewards) that has been 
argued and shown in other privacy-related research studies to be of some importance in 
individuals’ decision-making (e.g., [1, 23, 86]) but that has been overlooked too in the 
regulation studies.  Our objective in testing this model is to provide a more cohesive view of 
privacy regulation findings and to also extend those findings by incorporating what we 
believe to be some of the most promising constructs from the broader privacy research 
domain.  We turn now to the specific model that is addressed in this study.
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TABLE 11 
PREVIOUS STUDIES – GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION AND OUTCOMES (INDIVIDUAL LEVEL) 
 
Article Sample Antecedents2 Dependent Variable Mediators/Moderators 
Dommeyer and 
Gross [25] 
137 respondents to a mailed survey; list 
generated by broker 
Awareness of privacy-
related laws and privacy-
protecting strategies 
Use of privacy-protecting 
strategies (self-reported) 
Age, gender, telephone number 
listing status, desire to receive 
direct marketing solicitations 
Lee [40] 23 adults (selection procedure unclear) Advocacy level Desire for online regulation Age, occupation 
Lwin, Wirtz, and 
Williams [45] 
180 adults provided by commercial 
research firm (experimental treatments 
applied) 
Perceived influences 
(policy, regulation) 
User intentions (self-reported) Data sensitivity, data 
congruency, online privacy 
concern 
Milberg, Smith, 
and Burke [49] 
595 members of Information Systems 
Audit & Control Association at 63 
chapter meetings 
Cultural values Privacy concerns, regulatory 
approach, corporate privacy 
management, privacy problems 
Regulatory preference 
Okazaki, Li, and 
Hirose [58] 
510 mobile phone users, recruited by a 
professional research firm (experimental 
treatment applied) 
Prior negative experience Information privacy concerns, 
trust, risk, sensitivity of 
information request, perceived 
ubiquity 
Preference for degree of 
regulatory control 
Turow, Hennessy, 
and Bleakley [79] 
1,500 adults in telephone survey 
(random dial sample) 
None  Level of knowledge of privacy 
rules 
Gender, age, race/ethnicity, 
education, family income, 
parental status 
Wirtz, Lwin, and 
Williams [82] 
182 online subjects (recruited from 
commercial database) 
Business policy, 
governmental regulation 
User intentions (self-reported) Privacy concerns 
Xu, Teo, Tan, and 
Agarwal [85] 
178 online Web respondents 
(experimental treatments applied) 
Individual self-protection, 
industry self-regulation, 
government legislation  
Context-specific concerns for 
information privacy 
Perceived control over personal 
information, age, gender, 
education, desire for information 
control, trust propensity, privacy 
experience 
                                                 
1 Our search for articles was conducted using several online databases of scholarly articles.  We began by searching on salient keywords and proceeded by following citation 
trails that showed which articles were being cited by others.  While we cannot claim this list to be fully exhaustive, we do believe it to be largely comprehensive within the 
boundaries of our search algorithm.   
2 Antecedents, dependent variables, and mediators/moderators were categorized by this study’s authors based on their reading of the cited articles.   
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3. Model development 
As can be seen in Figure 1 and Table 2, we examine the relationship between an 
antecedent (regulatory knowledge), a set of mediating variables (perceived privacy regulatory 
protection, trust, and privacy risk concerns), a set of outcomes (regulatory preferences and 
protection behavior), and a variable with both direct and moderating effects (perceived 
rewards).  Our derivation of hypotheses relies on some of the articles listed in Table 1 but also 
on some other studies that have examined subordinate portions of the model (even if they did 
not consider the regulatory constructs) or that provide useful theoretical insights that may 
extrapolate to the immediate model.  In addition, in some cases, we rely on our own 
argumentation to defend some hypotheses.  We do not claim our model to be an exhaustive 
one, given the paucity of theoretical development in this research domain (see Table 1) and 
the constraints associated with data collection.  Rather, we have attempted to address a set of 
variables that is most likely to produce insights from this exploratory study and to inform 
future efforts in this domain.    
FIGURE 1 
RESEARCH MODEL 
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TABLE 2 
HYPOTHESES 
 
H1 Higher levels of knowledge regarding regulation will be associated with higher levels of 
perceived privacy regulatory protection. 
H2 Higher levels of perceived privacy regulatory protection will be associated with higher levels 
of trust in entities associated with information privacy. 
H3 Higher levels of trust in entities associated with information privacy will be associated with 
lower levels of privacy risk concerns. 
H4 Higher levels of perceived privacy regulatory protection will be associated with lower levels of 
privacy risk concerns. 
H5 Higher levels of privacy risk concerns will be associated with higher levels of protection 
behavior. 
H6 Higher levels of privacy risk concerns will be associated with stronger preferences for 
regulatory protections. 
H7 Larger perceived rewards will be associated with lower levels of protection behavior. 
H8 Larger perceived rewards will be associated with weaker preferences for regulatory 
protections.   
H9 The relationship between privacy risk concerns and protection behavior will be moderated by 
the level of perceived rewards, such that larger perceived rewards will weaken the relationship. 
H10 The relationship between privacy risk concerns and regulatory preferences will be moderated 
by the level of perceived rewards, such that larger perceived rewards will weaken the 
relationship. 
 
3.1 Regulatory knowledge and perceived privacy regulatory protection  
 Smith et al. [71] noted that a small stream of research has focused on individuals’ 
awareness of privacy policies and practices and how such awareness is associated with those 
individuals’ perceptions and behavior.  However, most of the studies in this category (e.g., 
[19, 56, 57] revolved around organizational policies and practices.  It has been rare for 
researchers to consider relationships between individuals’ level of knowledge regarding 
privacy regulation and other variables; to the best of our knowledge, only Dommeyer and 
Gross [25] took this approach. 
 Perceived privacy regulatory protection refers to an individual’s perceptions regarding 
the existence and adequacy of provisions and systems for protecting his/her personal data.  As 
will be discussed below (in Section 3.2), we view individuals’ perceptions regarding privacy 
regulatory protection as being a salient factor in determining their trust in entities associated 
with information privacy.  It stands to reason that an individual’s level of knowledge 
regarding such protection should factor into his or her perceptions of the protection itself.  
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Ironically, however, past research (e.g., [49]) did not consider such a relationship in assessing 
privacy regulation perceptions. 
 Given the paucity of previous research regarding this relationship, we are forced to 
form an exploratory hypothesis. We conjecture that many perceptions of inadequate 
regulatory protection may in fact be grounded in individuals’ lack of knowledge regarding the 
protection that already exists.  As was shown by Dommeyer and Gross [25], this level of 
knowledge is alarmingly low in some areas, and – while we are unable to infer strict causality 
in this relationship – findings that consumers perceive regulation as lacking (e.g. [26]) are at 
least temporally correlated with this lack of knowledge. We state our hypothesis in the 
positive form: 
H1:  Higher levels of knowledge regarding regulation will be associated with higher levels of 
perceived privacy regulatory protection. 
 
3.2 Trust 
 
As was discussed by Smith et al. [71], the construct of trust has been considered in a 
number of research models associated with privacy.  However, its specific relationship to 
other privacy-related constructs has not been consistent across studies, with trust serving 
variously as an antecedent, outcome, mediator, or moderator.   In this study, for reasons to be 
discussed below, we consider trust to have a mediating role.   
To a great degree, our view of trust as a mediating construct is a function of the 
specific form of trust that is examined in our study:  trust in governmental and commercial 
entities that are associated with information privacy.  Note that this differs from interpersonal 
or dyadic trust, which is trust between people, whose relationships may or may not rest in an 
organizational domain [47, 67]. The concept of trust embraced in our study is what has been 
called “impersonal trust” [20] and that has been explored by McKnight, Choudhury, and 
Kacmar [48] and considered in a complex research model by Bansal, Zahedi, and Gefen [5].  
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To the best of our knowledge, prior research has not considered how impersonal trust 
(in both governmental and commercial entities) is associated with individuals’ perceptions of 
regulatory protection.  Although it may at first glance appear that such a relationship borders 
on the tautological (i.e., if one believes that one is safe in dealing with an entity, one will trust 
that entity), the demarcation embraced in this study is more complex:  individuals could have 
a high level of trust in their government and/or a commercial entity, regardless of whether 
their own government provides protection in the form of regulation.  In fact, it is this very 
premise that undergirds what has been called the “voluntary control” model of regulation [8, 
69], which assumes that organizations’ voluntary embrace of privacy-related policies and 
practices will be associated with individuals’ trust.  In such a model, governmental regulation 
stands only as a backstop against the failure of such voluntary efforts.  It has been noted that 
the privacy regulatory framework in the U.S. relies greatly on this approach [8, 69]. 
However, although such a model can be observed to be in use, we argue that it is not 
emotionally embraced by individuals when they engage in privacy-related decision-making.  
Although the constructs of trust and perceived regulatory protection can be logically separated 
(see above), we argue that - in practice - individuals emotionally connect the two. 
Acknowledging that this relationship is based more on our own argumentation than on 
previous research, we postulate: 
H2:  Higher levels of perceived privacy regulatory protection will be associated with higher 
levels of trust in entities associated with information privacy. 
 
3.3 Privacy risk concerns  
 Concerns associated with privacy and its risks have long assumed a central role in the 
majority of privacy-related studies, to the point that Smith et al [71] termed their privacy 
research macro-model “APCO,” with “PC” standing for “Privacy Concerns.”  In this study, 
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we term this central research construct “privacy risk concerns,” since individuals’ concerns 
about risks are likely the most salient attribute in a regulatory context. 
 We rely on the models studied by Bélanger, Hiller, and Smith [7] and Culnan and 
Armstrong [20], in which trust serves as an antecedent to constructs associated with privacy 
concerns. Once an individual establishes trust in salient entities (and this could occur via 
many different routes, with regulatory protection being our construct of interest in the 
immediate study), (s)he is likely to exhibit reduced levels of privacy risk concern, since (s)he 
views the likelihood of negative outcomes to be reduced:  
H3:  Higher levels of trust in entities associated with information privacy will be associated 
with lower levels of privacy risk concerns. 
 
3.4 Perceived privacy regulatory protection and privacy risk concerns  
 Lwin, Wirtz, and Williams [45] used power-relationship theory from sociology and 
social psychology to develop a model explaining individuals’ perceptions and responses 
associated with regulation.  In particular, they showed that there is a strong and direct 
association between individuals’ perceptions of legal/regulatory policies and those 
individuals’ risk concerns regarding online activities (called “online privacy concern” in their 
model).  Through a controlled experiment, they demonstrated that the weaker an individual 
perceives the privacy-protection regulations in his/her own country and at an international 
level, the more strongly the individual perceives the risks of information being used and 
shared inappropriately and web activities being tracked, and the individual will respond 
behaviorally to those perceptions.  Lwin et al [45, p. 575] explain this as a desire to “reduce 
the perceived lack of equilibrium” that is associated with a perception of imbalance between 
perceived regulatory power and personal responsibility.  
 Consistent with this argument and findings, we propose: 
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H4:  Higher levels of perceived privacy regulatory protection will be associated with lower 
levels of privacy risk concerns. 
 
3.5 Privacy risk concerns and protection behavior  
 In comparison to other topics in information privacy, researchers have devoted a large 
amount of attention to the relationship between privacy risk concerns (sometimes using a 
different label for the construct) and protection behavior [71, 84]. The forms of these 
behavioral responses can vary:  for example, individuals may either embrace or resist 
adoption of new technologies that protect privacy or challenge it [52], submit false data [25, 
45, 86], refuse to purchase/register at a website [25, 45, 50, 86], request that data be removed 
[24, 50], and/or seek additional information (e.g., privacy statement) [50, 86].  
 With only a few exceptions, which may be attributable to saturated models with other 
explanatory variables (e.g., [60]) or the existence of a “privacy paradox” [55], researchers 
have usually found a direct link between individuals’ privacy risk concerns and behavioral 
responses to those perceptions, even though the precise form of the behavioral responses may 
vary by individual and context [71].  Thus, while acknowledging that some contradictions to 
the main body of findings do exist, we propose:  
H5:  Higher levels of privacy risk concerns will be associated with higher levels of protection 
behavior. 
 
3.6 Privacy risk concerns and regulatory preferences  
 Compared to the prior research stream associated with H5 (above), there are relatively 
few studies that consider the relationship between privacy risk concerns and regulatory 
preferences, which can be defined as an individual’s preferences regarding the degree of 
regulatory control in his or her country to enforce user control of privacy.  We note only two 
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studies that offer substantive guidance regarding this relationship. Okazaki, Li, and Hirose 
[58] found that individuals with higher concerns about risks in using mobile advertising 
applications prefer stricter regulatory controls to be enforced by the government.  Earlier, 
Milberg, Smith, and Burke [49] found that a similar construct (with a different name) had the 
same effect on regulatory preferences – in their study, individuals who were more concerned 
about privacy risks indicated a stronger preference for regulation based on law than on 
corporate self-governance.   
 We expect that a similar relationship will be found in our own examination of 
relationships with regulatory preferences:   
H6:  Higher levels of privacy risk concerns will be associated with stronger preferences for 
regulatory protections. 
 
3.7 Perceptions of rewards  
Studies based on the theory of privacy calculus (e.g., [20]) have shown that individuals 
may, in certain circumstances, engage in a cost-benefit analysis when making privacy-related 
decisions.  Those studies usually view costs (including risks) and rewards (in most ways, 
synonymous with “benefits”) as being directly juxtaposed against one another in a rational 
calculation. 
To the extent that individuals do engage in a cognitive assessment of the tradeoff 
between costs and benefits in making privacy-related behavioral decisions, it stands to reason 
that the more individuals believe they will gain, the more they will be willing to give up some 
amount of privacy (or take more privacy-related risks) if they believe that they stand to gain 
from that decision.  This calculus could manifest itself in protection behavior and/or in 
different preferences for regulatory protection.  Hence, we propose: 
H7: Larger perceived rewards will be associated with lower levels of protection behavior. 
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H8: Larger perceived rewards will be associated with weaker preferences for regulatory 
protections.    
 
3.8 Moderator:  Perceived rewards    
 Although traditional studies utilizing privacy calculus had considered only direct 
assessments of rewards and costs, a recent study [60] has demonstrated a more complex 
relationship in which “rewards” act as a moderator in some other relationships. The earlier, 
simplistic juxtaposition of costs and benefits is enriched by this recent extension to the model.  
Therefore, we include this enhanced approach in this study. 
 Park et al [60, p. 1026] found that “interactive effects are subtle and depend on levels 
of concern and, particularly, reward-seeking.”  Although their study focused on a number of 
linkages other than those associated with regulation, it is clear that several of their findings – 
in particular, that relationships between variables such as knowledge and concerns about 
information risks are moderated by rewards – are salient for our model.  We extrapolate their 
findings to postulate that relationships between privacy risk concerns and outcomes 
(protection behavior and regulatory preferences) are more complex than are commonly 
realized.  These relationships, while based in direct linkages, are moderated by perceptions of 
rewards.  We postulate as follows:  
H9:  The relationship between privacy risk concerns and protection behavior will be 
moderated by the level of perceived rewards, such that larger perceived rewards will weaken 
the relationship. 
H10:  The relationship between privacy risk concerns and regulatory preferences will be 
moderated by the level of perceived rewards, such that larger perceived rewards will weaken 
the relationship. 
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4. Methods  
4.1 Sampling 
This study focuses on young UK people aged 18 to 25 years.  This subsection of the 
population is known to be less wary regarding personal information than other demographic 
subsections [87]. As people between 18-25 years old have distinctive online habits and make 
up 11 to 16% of the European population, this group is an important object of study in itself.  
Moreover, some of these young people will become key decision-makers in information 
technology (IT), and this generation as a whole will confront privacy-related issues to a 
degree their parents’ generation will not. Therefore, it is vital to study young people in order 
to gain knowledge of how these issues are perceived and what are the behavioral 
consequences. In fact, a study focusing on today’s 18 to 25 year olds provides our best 
opportunity to examine what will likely be widespread attitudes and behavior in tomorrow’s 
society, particularly regarding privacy-related issues.  
To date, most articles on privacy-related disclosure decisions have used United States 
samples [6], and the mix of student and consumer/professional samples varies by topic area 
[6].  Pavlou [61] notes a call for “a broader diversity of sampling populations by tapping 
nonstudent populations outside the United States.”  To that end, this study uses a non-U.S. 
sample of both students and nonstudents.    
Our data collection was done in cooperation with the European Community (EC), 
which funded our efforts.  Terms of the data collection – including specifics of the sampling 
and the contents of the administered survey – were negotiated with the EC.  We gratefully 
acknowledge the EC for their support. 
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4.2 Administration of the questionnaire 
Data were gathered through an online survey. Invitations to participate to the survey 
were emailed to 140,476 UK young people,3 selected through a database of European internet 
users managed by a French interactive marketing company, 1000mercis, through its fidelity 
program. We selected our sample through quotas based on data obtained from Eurostat. This 
enabled us to achieve a balance of genders and ages across the spectrum.  We embraced this 
method rather than using a convenience sample because it provides greater potential for 
generalization, thus increasing the results’ external validity.  Our final sample in this study 
consisted of 925 fully completed questionnaires4 from UK respondents 18 to 25 years old.  
 
4.3 Description of the final sample 
Table 3 shows the characteristics of the final sample. To test for nonresponse bias, a 
wave analysis was conducted to compare the first and last quartile of respondents in terms of 
demographic characteristics and key study variables [3]. The results (reported in Appendix 1) 
indicated that the later respondents (last quartile) were quite similar to the early ones (first 
quartile) with respect to age, gender and almost all of the constructs used in this study. Using 
two-tailed tests, we found that there were no differences between early and late respondents 
for 10 of the 13 tested constructs.  We found marginally significant differences for two 
constructs and a significant difference for one.  However, the directionality of those 
differences was inconsistent with what would have been observed had there been a non-
response bias (that is, had early/late responders perceived more/less regulatory protection, 
consequently been less/more concerned about privacy and had engaged in less/more 
cautionary behavior).  Thus, we conclude that nonresponse bias is not a concern in this study.  
                                                 
3 The invitations were sent to individuals who were from 15 to 25 years old.  In this study, we have omitted those 
respondents who were 15 to 17 years old.   
4 Only the participants who answered the entire survey have been retained here to eliminate the potential issue of 
missing data.  
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TABLE 3 
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SAMPLE 
 
Variables Sample Composition 
Age Mean = 20.9; std. dev = 2.22; range 18-25 
18-21 = 59.5%; 22-25 = 40.5% 
Gender Female 36.6% 
Male 63.4% 
Highest Education Level Attained Secondary School or Less 47.2% 
Graduate Degree 26.6% 
Postgraduate Degree 10.5% 
PhD Degree 1.7% 
Professional Activity Student  25.8% 
Self employed 8.5% 
Manager 13.5% 
Other white collar 10.2% 
Blue collar 4.3% 
Homemaker 4.0% 
Unemployed 6.2% 
Military/civil 3,4% 
other 24.1% 
 
4.4 Measurement 
We employed multi-item scales to measure the constructs within our theoretical 
model.  We derived these instruments from the literature by integrating constructs from 
existing scales (e.g., protection behavior) or incorporating items from a previous exploratory 
qualitative study (e.g., regulatory preferences). Because the data collection was funded by the 
EC, negotiation regarding the contents of the survey instrument was necessary.  In particular, 
the EC asked that the use of multiple items be limited so as to shorten the survey, and that 
specific Likert scales be used for many items.5  As a result, we were not always able to 
include all the survey items we would have liked. 
To verify their content validity, all scales were first pre-tested and validated.  A two-
day workshop, hosted by the EC and attended by both EC policymakers and members of the 
academic community, was utilized.  During this workshop, all the items in the survey were 
                                                 
5 Likert scales on the survey varied from 4 to 7 points.  Previous research (e.g., [10, 11, 21, 37, 64]) suggests that 
results are usually invariant across the Likert ranges used in this study.   
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discussed, and a number were revised.  We then pre-tested the survey with 117 young UK 
subjects. This pre-testing allowed us to reformulate some questions and remove others. (See 
Appendix 3 for the items used in this study.)   
The item measuring regulatory knowledge (RK) figured the level of respondent’s 
awareness regarding privacy regulation in his/her country using a 1-item 4-point nominal 
scale from “I never heard about it” (1) to “I know it very well” (4). 
The scale measuring perceived privacy regulatory protection (PRP) used six items 
taken from a previous EC survey on citizens’ trust in ID systems and authorities [4].   
The items measuring trust were developed taking into account both the digital 
environment and the specific focus of this study along with the previous literature on trust.  
We considered two different targets of trust, both the commercial entities with which any user 
can be in relation as regards personal data handling (i.e. “companies”) and the entities that 
may offer some regulatory protection in this respect (i.e., “regulators”). Previous literature 
already distinguished trust in public versus private entities (e.g. [51]) but mostly focused on 
one of these two targets (e.g., [22] considered only regulatory trust). We referenced three 
kinds of companies (a company that is well known to consumers, a company with which the 
user is familiar due to a previous relationship, and a company that is unknown to the user) and 
three regulatory institutions that can offer some support (the local council, the national 
government, and the European Union) to form the two main targets of trust in our model, 
named respectively “trust in companies” (TC) and “trust in regulators” (TR).  
Both public opinion surveys and previous privacy literature show that people are 
significantly concerned about a range of possible privacy consequences of the spreading of 
their personal data. The perceived privacy risk concerns (PR) scale used in this study contains 
items in a Likert format used to identify the importance of two kinds of privacy risks that 
were identified in previous literature and confirmed through a preliminary exploratory study. 
18 
 
One deals with personal data handling mainly related to “data tracking” (DT) and the second 
with identity and financial fraud, which will be referred to “identity damage” (ID). Five and 
six items adapted from previous literature and the preliminary study form the privacy risk 
concerns scale used in the study, respectively referring to the data tracking and the identity 
damage concerns dimensions. 
Protection behavior (PB) is a second-order construct distinguishing different forms of 
personal data protection strategies. Previous literature is rather inconclusive regarding the 
different dimensions that should be differentiated in this respect. Some authors differentiate 
social and technical protection (e.g. [60]), while others consider active versus passive 
protection (e.g. [24]). In most cases, studies include both technical protection and some other 
forms of protection. We embraced this dichotomy in developing our scale. Like Buchanan et 
al. [9], we considered “technical protection” (TP) and “general caution” (GC) as two 
important dimensions of protection to which we added a “withholding” (WI) dimension 
(called “refrain” by Youn [86]).   We adapted from those previous scales a set of twelve 
(seven plus three plus two, respectively) measures that people can take to protect their 
privacy.  The items asked whether participants never (1) to always (4) used these protection 
measures. 
Regulatory preferences (RP) refer to the preferences any user could have regarding the 
degree of regulatory control in his/her country (i.e., regarding governments’ actions that could 
be implemented to enforce user control of privacy). During the workshop, we clarified the 
different actions that could be taken by a government in this respect including awareness 
raising (using educational or informational methods) and direct intervention (more resources, 
more user control, pressure on service provider). We created five items measuring the 
perceived efficiency of each measure on a Likert scale from 1 (not at all efficient) to 4 (very 
efficient). 
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In line with the consumer behavior literature that distinguishes between utilitarian and 
hedonic products [33, 35] and the IS literature that distinguishes between utilitarian and 
hedonic information systems [80], we distinguish two kinds of rewards – utilitarian and 
hedonic – that the user can expect in exchange for his/her personal data.  During the expert 
workshop, we clarified the different benefits that a user may obtain in exchange for his/her 
personal data, including those that aim to provide instrumental value to the user (utilitarian 
rewards such as receiving money or coupons) versus those which aim to provide self-fulfilling 
value to the user (hedonic rewards such as connecting with friends).  Five plus four items 
representing utilitarian (UR) versus hedonic rewards (HR), respectively, were used in the final 
survey. Participants were asked how likely (from “very unlikely” (1) to “very likely” (5)) they 
were to provide personal data for each benefit. 
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TABLE 4 
CONSTRUCT MEASUREMENT 
 
Construct Scale format 
Number 
of items 
Source 
Regulatory 
Knowledge 
4-point nominal scale from ‘I never heard about my rights in terms of 
data protection’ (1) to ‘I know my rights … very well’ (4) 
1 
Developed via a preliminary exploratory 
study and pre-tested through an expert 
workshop 
Perceived 
privacy 
regulatory 
protection 
7- point Likert scale from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (7). 6 Taken from [4] 
Trust 
5- point Likert scale from “no trust at all” (1) to “very much trust” (5). 
Two different trust targets: companies and regulators. 
6 
(3 + 3) 
Developed in relation to previous literature 
Privacy risk 
concerns 
5- point Likert scale from “not concerned” (1) to “very concerned” (5). 
Two dimensions of concerns: data tracking and identity damage. 
11 
(6 + 5) 
Developed via a preliminary exploratory 
study and pre-tested through an expert 
workshop 
Protection 
behavior 
Second-order construct with 3 first order dimensions depending on the 
kind of protection used: 
Technical protection (e.g. using firewalls), General caution (e.g. reading 
privacy notices) and Withholding (e.g. not giving personal details), Self-
evaluation of current and future use from “never” (1) to “always” (4). 
12 
(7 + 3 + 2) 
Adapted from previous scales (e.g. [50]) 
Regulatory 
preferences 
Perceived efficiency of different actions that could be set up by a 
government to enforce user control on its privacy. 
From “not at all efficient” (1) to “very efficient” (4). 
5 
Developed via a preliminary exploratory 
study and pre-tested through an expert 
workshop 
Perceived 
rewards 
Likelihood to provide personal data in exchange of utilitarian versus 
hedonic rewards from “very unlikely” (1) to “very likely” (5). 
9 
(5 + 4) 
Developed via a preliminary exploratory 
study and pre-tested through an expert 
workshop 
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4.5 Data analysis method 
We used a structural equation modeling (SEM) approach to validate the measures 
and test the proposed relationships. This method allows simultaneous examination of the 
measurement and structural models and provides a complete analysis of inter-relationships in 
the model [28]. A component-based6 partial least squares (PLS) method was utilized to 
accommodate the exploratory nature of the research model, the presence of a large number of 
variables [38, 42], and the complexity of the model.  PLS is not constrained by identification 
concerns even if the model becomes complex, a situation that would typically restrict CB-
SEM usage [31]. PLS is also preferred over CB-SEM because we are focusing on predicting 
the users’ protection behavior and their regulatory preferences. Furthermore, PLS path 
modeling is more suitable than CB-SEM for testing models with hierarchical constructs and 
mediating variables [14].  
PLS does not automatically generate an overall goodness-of-fit index (as CB-SEM does), 
so model validity is assessed primarily by examining the structural paths and R2 values [16]. 
PLS path modeling allows for the conceptualization of a hierarchical model through the 
repeated use of manifest variables (i.e., the higher order component uses all indicators of the 
lower order components [30, 43, 54, 77, 83]). Lohmöller [43] showed this indicator reuse 
approach is suitable for the analysis of hierarchical component models in PLS. We constructed 
the reflective, hierarchical construct model in PLS path modeling using the two steps below: 
(1) We constructed the first-order latent variables (trust - in companies and in regulators, 
privacy risk concerns - data tracking and identity damage, perceived rewards - utilitarian and 
hedonic, protection behavior - technical, general caution and withholding) and related them to 
their respective block of manifest variables using reflective indicators in the measurement 
model. 
                                                 
6 Other SEM techniques (in particular, those using AMOS or LISREL software packages) are covariance-based 
(called “CB-SEM”).   
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(2) We then constructed the second-order latent variables (trust, privacy risk concerns, 
perceived rewards, and protection behavior) by relating them to the blocks of the underlying 
first-order latent variables viewed as reflective indicators for these second-order latent 
variables7.  
 
5. Results 
Structural equation models should be analyzed in two stages: the measurement model 
and the structural model [2]. The estimates of the measurement model, which consists of the 
relationships between constructs and the indicators used to measure them, allow us to assess 
the psychometric properties of the scales. 
We used SmartPLS 3.1 [65] to estimate the parameters in the measurement and 
structural models using a path weighting scheme for the inside approximation [12, 13, 77]. 
We also used the standard bootstrapping procedure implemented in SmartPLS with 500 
replications to obtain the standard errors of the estimates.8 
 
5.1 Test for Common Method Bias 
We first checked for common method bias (CMB) in our data. CMB can be addressed 
a posteriori through statistical analysis [62]. We used two methods to statistically assess 
CMB.9 The first approach – which is increasingly in dispute [63, Appendix] but still widely 
reported (e.g. [36, 53, 59, 81]) - employed Harman’s single-factor test [62]. All the variables 
were loaded into an exploratory factor analysis (EFA), and the unrotated factor solution was 
examined. Common method bias may exist if (1) a single factor emerges from the unrotated 
                                                 
7 The loadings of the first order factors on the second-order factors were as follows: for trust: trust in companies 
(.812) and trust in regulators (.925); for privacy risk concerns: data tracking (.953) and identity damage (.931); 
for perceived rewards: utilitarian (.946) and hedonic (.937); for protection behavior: technical protection (.962), 
caution (.745) and withholding (.505). 
8 We used "Bias-Corrected and Accelerated (BCa) Bootstrap" as it is the most stable method that does not need 
excessive computing time. 
9 Following Chin et al.’s [15]  recent advice, we did not embrace the approach of Liang et al. [42]. 
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factor solution, or (2) one general factor accounts for the majority of the covariance in the 
variables [62].  Neither occurred here, suggesting that CMB should not be an issue in this 
study. We also followed the approach used for example by Liang et al. [42]. Using SmartPLS, 
we specified a method factor together with the original latent variables in the measurement 
model, and we calculated the squared factor loadings for both the method factor and the 
substantive factors (i.e., original latent variables). The average variance explained by the 
substantive factors was around 0.70 while that by the method factor was around 0.06, thus 
confirming that common method bias is not a concern in our study (see Appendix 2). 
 
5.2 Measurement model: Instrument validation 
Measurement model assessment involves examining individual indicator reliabilities 
(through the squared standardized outer loadings), the reliabilities for each construct’s 
composite of measures (i.e., internal consistency reliability using the composite reliability 
scores), and the measures’ convergent (using the average variance extracted, AVE) and 
discriminant (using the Fornell-Larcker criterion and the cross-loadings) validities.  
After removing some items with very low factor loadings or high cross-loadings, the 
reliability, convergent validity, and discriminant validity of the instrument were first 
examined. Appendix 4 shows that all but one of the remaining loadings are larger than the 
suggested threshold of 0.70 [12]. One item for regulatory preferences (RP3) has a loading of 
0.61.  In general, standardized loadings of 0.70 or greater are needed for the shared variance 
between each item and its construct to exceed the error variance, but loadings of .60 - .70 are 
often considered acceptable if the loadings of other items within the same construct are high 
[12, 13].  Thus, we have retained all the items. 
Table 5 shows that all composite reliabilities are larger than the suggested 0.70, and all 
AVE values are greater than the suggested .50, indicating good convergent validity for the 
measurement model [28].  For sufficient discriminant validity to be present, items should load 
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more strongly on their own constructs, and the average variance shared between each 
construct and its measures should be greater than the variance shared between the construct 
and other constructs [17]. Appendix 5 shows that items load much more highly on their own 
latent constructs than on any other latent constructs (cross-loadings). In addition, the AVE 
square roots are larger than correlations among constructs (Table 6). Therefore, discriminant 
validity is achieved. 
TABLE 5 
STATISTICS FOR CONSTRUCTS 
 
 
Number 
of items 
Mean Std Dev. CR AVE 
R 
Square 
Cronbach 
Alpha 
RK 1 2.75 .842 - - - - 
PRP 6 3.18 1.37 0.935 0.707 0.005 0.917 
TR 3 3.42 1.16 0.951 0.866 0.857 0.919 
TC 2 2.67 .90 0.951 0.906 0.661 0.893 
DT 6 3.20 .79 0.939 0.719 0.908 0.921 
ID 5 1.74 .85 0.933 0.736 0.867 0.910 
UR 5 3.22 .92 0.892 0.624 0.894 0.849 
HR 4 3.40 .91 0.911 0.721 0.877 0.869 
TP 7 2.93 .78 0.914 0.604 0.925 0.890 
GC 2 2.33 .90 0.882 0.788 0.555 0.733 
WI 2 2.57 .66 0.803 0.670 0.255 0.509 
RP 5 3.05 .58 0.869 0.572 0.086 0.810 
 
LEGEND:   RK: Regulatory Knowledge 
  PRP: Perceived Privacy Regulatory Protection 
TR: Trust in Regulators (trust – Dimension 1)  
  TC: Trust in Companies (trust – Dimension 2)  
  DT: Data Tracking (privacy risk concerns – Dimension 1) 
  ID: Identity Damage (privacy risk concerns – Dimension 2) 
  UR: Utilitarian Rewards (rewards – Dimension 1) 
  HR: Hedonic Rewards (rewards – Dimension 2) 
  TP: Technical Protection (protection behavior – Dimension 1) 
  GC: General Caution (protection behavior – Dimension 2) 
  WI: WIthholding (protection behavior – Dimension 3) 
RP: Regulatory Preferences 
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TABLE 6 
CORRELATIONS AND SQUARED ROOTS OF AVE’S 
 
 
RK PRP TR TC DT ID UR HR PB GC WI RP 
RK 1.000            
PRP 0.072 0.841           
TR -0.038 0.449 0.931          
TC -0.044 0.341 0.530 0.952         
DT 0.130 -0.311 -0.235 -0.167 0.848        
ID 0.087 -0.256 -0.172 -0.111 0.776 0.858       
UR -0.056 0.298 0.365 0.395 -0.141 -0.022 0.790      
HR 0.009 0.262 0.328 0.366 -0.039 0.013 0.772 0.849     
PB 0.321 -0.081 -0.207 -0.134 0.249 0.202 -0.241 -0.197 0.777    
GC 0.216 0.033 -0.107 -0.127 0.120 0.132 -0.167 -0.155 0.584 0.888   
WI 0.144 -0.115 -0.210 -0.145 0.195 0.129 -0.269 -0.262 0.349 0.292 0.819  
RP 0.048 -0.025 0.054 0.105 0.231 0.188 -0.122 -0.182 0.139 0.084 0.049 0.756 
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TABLE 7 
TESTS OF HYPOTHESES 
 
Hyp. Paths Beta St Dev T Statistics P-value Result 
H1 Regulatory Knowledge -> Perceived Regulatory Protection 0.075 0.034 2.132 * Supported 
H2 Perceived Regulatory Protection -> Trust  0.460 0.031 14.973 *** Supported 
H3 Trust -> Privacy Risk Concerns -0.100 0.035 2.839 ** Supported 
H4 Perceived Regulatory Protection -> Privacy Risk Concerns -0.253 0.040 6.418 *** Supported 
H5         Privacy Risk Concerns-> Protection Behavior 0.227 0.037 6.063 *** Supported 
H6        Privacy Risk Concerns-> Regulatory Preferences 0.229 0.035 6.379 **** Supported 
H7 Rewards -> Protection Behavior -0.240 0.035 6.923 *** Supported 
H8 Rewards -> Regulatory Preferences -0.173 0.039 4.693 *** Supported 
H9 Privacy Risk Concerns * Rewards -> Protection Behavior -0.108 0.053 1.558 > 0.05 Not Supported 
H10 
Privacy Risk Concerns * Rewards -> Regulatory 
Preferences 
-0.034 0.120 0.772 > 0.05 Not supported 
 
 
 
LEGEND:   *  p < .05 
**  p < .01 
***  p < .001   
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FIGURE 2 
RESULTS MODEL 
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5.3 Structural model: Hypotheses tests 
As the measurement model evaluation provided evidence of reliability and validity, we 
now turn to an examination of the structural model estimates. The primary criterion for this 
structural assessment is the coefficient of determination (R²), which represents the amount of 
explained variance of each endogenous latent variable. Standardized path coefficients provide 
other evidence of the structural model’s quality, and their significance is assessed using 
resampling procedures. 
A structural model with the effects hypothesized in our conceptual model was 
examined. The results of this model and of hypotheses testing are summarized in Table 7 and 
Figure 2. Eight of the ten hypotheses are validated, and the model explains 10% of privacy 
risk concerns, 21.3% of trust, 12.9% of protection behavior, and 8.6% of regulatory 
preferences.  Regarding these percentages, it will be recalled that we do not claim our model 
to be an exhaustive one, given the paucity of theoretical development in this research domain.  
As will be discussed in Section 6.2.2, future studies could embrace more complex models 
with additional constructs. 
We supposed that perceived privacy regulatory protection would be negatively 
influenced by awareness of privacy regulation, and it proved to be true (b = 0.075, t = 2.132), 
therefore supporting H1. We also predicted that trust (both in regulators and in companies) 
would be positively influenced by perceived privacy regulatory protection and found that this 
is indeed the case (b = 0.460, t = 14.973), therefore supporting H2. Trust itself was expected 
to negatively influence privacy risk concerns, and we validate this effect (b = -0.100, t = 
2.839), confirming H3. Perceived privacy regulatory protection was predicted to also directly 
and negatively influence privacy risk concerns and did influence them this way (b = -0.253, t 
= 6.418), therefore supporting H4. Privacy risk concerns were in turn predicted to influence 
both dependent variables. We found that privacy risk concerns indeed influenced both 
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protection behavior (b = 0.227, t = 6.063) and regulatory preferences (b = 0.229, t = 6.379), 
therefore supporting H5 and H6. The model also predicted a direct effect of perceived rewards 
on both protection behavior and regulatory preferences. We found that perceived rewards 
(both utilitarian and hedonic) have a significant negative influence on protection behavior (b 
= -0.240, t = 6.923), meaning that the more the person is expecting rewards in exchange of 
his/her data, the less (s)he tends to embrace any specific self-protection behavior, therefore 
validating H7. This result supports the privacy calculus process—that is, if the individual 
perceives there is some benefit to disclose data (especially if the benefits exceed the risks to 
do so), (s)he will be less interested in self-protecting his/her data We also found that 
perceived rewards have a significant negative influence on regulatory preferences (b = -0.173, 
t = 4.693), therefore validating H8. The more the individual is expecting rewards in exchange 
of his/her data, the less (s)he is looking for some help from the government to give him/her 
control of his/her data. We finally predicted an interaction effect between rewards and privacy 
risk concerns on protection behavior and regulatory preferences, respectively (H9 and H10). 
Although perceived rewards and privacy risk concerns both directly influence protection 
behavior and regulatory preferences, interaction effects are not significant.  
 
5.4 Mediation tests 
 Mediation in path models can be assessed by examining the relationship of the direct 
link (denoted as c) between two variables and the indirect link via the potential mediator 
variable (denoted as path a from the predictor to the mediator and as path b from the mediator 
to the endogenous variable). Mediation can be assumed if the indirect effect a x b is 
significant (i.e., if H0: a x b = 0 can be rejected). The asymptotical normally distributed z-
statistic can be used as a test: if the z-value exceeds 1.96 (at p < 0.05), then the null 
hypothesis can be rejected (i.e., there is no indirect effect) [74]. We calculated the z-statistic 
for each of the mediating effects present in our model. Results appear in Table 8. 
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 We find perceived regulatory protection significantly mediates the effect between 
regulatory knowledge and both trust (z = 2.007 > 1.96) and privacy risk concerns (z = |-1.970| 
> 1.96), consistent with the reported results (in Table 7) for H1 and H3. In addition, we 
confirm that trust is a significant mediator between perceived regulatory protection and 
privacy risk concerns (z = |-2.422| > 1.96), consistent with our reported findings (in Table 7) 
for H2, H3 and H4. Finally, we confirm privacy risk concerns are a significant mediator 
between perceived regulatory protection and both protection behavior (z = |-4.845| > 1.96) 
and regulatory preferences (z = |-4.527| > 1.96), consistent with our results for H4 to H6. 
 
5.5 Post-hoc analysis on the influence of previous experience 
 Privacy perceptions in general and especially regulatory perceptions are often inferred 
from individual knowledge or previous experience [71]. Our results clearly show the impact 
of knowledge on perceived regulatory protection, validating H1. To assess whether previous 
experience could also influence other parts of our model, we divided our sample into two 
groups related to their Internet experience on the basis of developed skills (see items in 
Appendix 3)—that is, the activities in which each respondent reporting engaging online from 
a list of eight classical activities (e.g., instant messaging, sharing pictures or videos, keeping a 
blog, checking emails).  The two groups are called respectively “Basic” (people engaging in 
only classical online activities such as checking emails and using a search engine) and 
“Advanced” (people embracing extensive functions on the Internet and social networking 
sites). We then conducted a multi-group analysis using SmartPLS 3.0 by comparing our 
model and the corresponding path coefficients between Basic (Bas) and Advanced (Adv) 
individuals. Results are shown in Table 9. 
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TABLE 8 
TESTS FOR MEDIATION 
 
 
Mediation effect 1 Mediation effect 2 Mediation effect 3 Mediation effect 4 Mediation effect 5 
Mediator tested 
Perceived Regulatory 
Protection 
Perceived Regulatory 
Protection 
Trust Privacy Risk Concerns Privacy Risk Concerns 
DV Trust Privacy Risk Concerns Privacy Risk Concerns Protection Behavior Regulatory Preference 
Path (a) 
Regulatory Knowledge --> 
Perceived Regulatory 
Protection 
Regulatory Knowledge 
--> Perceived Regulatory 
Protection 
Perceived Regulatory 
Protection --> Trust 
Perceived Regulatory 
Protection 
--> Privacy Risk Concerns 
Perceived Regulatory 
Protection 
--> Privacy Risk Concerns 
Path (b) 
Perceived Regulatory 
Protection 
--> Trust 
Perceived Regulatory 
Protection 
--> Privacy Risk Concerns 
Trust 
--> Privacy Risk Concerns 
Privacy Risk Concerns 
--> Protection Behavior 
Privacy Risk Concerns 
--> Regulatory Preferences 
(a) 0.071 0.071 0.467 -0.274 -0.274 
(b) 0.467 -0.274 -0.086 0.249 0.224 
DIRECT EFFECT 
(c) 
-0.079 0.133 -0.274 0.089 -0.006 
INDIRECT EFFECT 
(a x b) 
0.033 -0.019 -0.040 -0.068 -0.061 
TOTAL EFFECT 
(a x b + c ) 
-0.046 0.113 -0.314 0.021 -0.067 
z 2.007 > 1.96 |-1.970 |> 1.96 |-2.422| > 1.96 |-4.845|> 1.96 |-4.527|> 1.96 
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Two paths are clearly impacted by the respondents’ Internet experience. First, the 
influence of perceived regulatory protection on trust is higher for individuals who use the 
Internet for advanced tasks (b = 0.552 for Advanced vs. b = 0.435 for Basic, p = 0.042). 
Second, there is a significant difference between Basic and Advanced individuals regarding 
the influence of perceived rewards on regulatory preferences (p = 0.033): the influence of 
perceived rewards is massive for Advanced individuals but insignificant for Basic individuals.  
We therefore find some support for the role of experience in influencing privacy perceptions 
and behavior especially regarding regulation, confirming some assertions from previous 
literature [58]. The influence is not general, however, but is specific to the links between 
perceived regulatory protection and trust and between rewards and regulatory preferences.   
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TABLE 9 
MULTI-GROUP TEST FOR THE IMPACT OF INTERNET EXPERIENCE 
 
Paths 
Path 
Coeff. 
(Adv) 
Path 
Coeff. 
(Bas) 
CI Low 
(Adv) 
CI 
Low 
(Bas) 
CI 
High 
(Adv) 
CI High 
(Bas) 
Path 
Coefficients-diff 
| Adv - Bas | 
p-Value           
(Adv vs. Bas) 
Sig. 
Regulatory Knowledge -> Perceived Regulatory Protection 0.120 0.023 0.019 -0.095 0.219 0.132 0.097 0.116 ns 
Perceived Regulatory Protection -> Trust 0.552 0.435 0.481 0.316 0.645 0.531 0.117 0.042 < 5% 
Trust -> Privacy Risk Concerns -0.184 -0.071 -0.332 -0.187 -0.082 0.043 0.113 0.908 ns 
Perceived Regulatory Protection -> Privacy Risk Concerns -0.228 -0.323 -0.350 -0.449 -0.102 -0.230 0.096 0.128 ns 
Privacy Risk Concerns -> Protection Behavior 0.284 0.173 0.172 0.051 0.367 0.285 0.112 0.083 ns 
Privacy Risk Concerns -> Regulatory Preferences 0.158 0.152 0.036 0.060 0.262 0.274 0.006 0.475 ns 
Perceived Rewards -> Protection Behavior -0.238 -0.252 -0.310 -0.335 -0.074 -0.082 0.014 0.434 ns 
Perceived Rewards -> Regulatory Preferences -0.248 -0.072 -0.043 0.146 -0.313 -0.110 0.176 0.033 < 5% 
Privacy Risk Concerns x Perceived Rewards->  
Protection Behavior 
-0.176 -0.129 -0.446 -0.481 -0.219 -0.216 0.047 NA ns 
Privacy Risk Concerns x Perceived Rewards->  
Regulatory Preferences 
0.159 -0.307 0.238 -0.547 0.438 0.490 -0.148 NA ns 
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6. Discussion  
 
This study makes three important contributions to the privacy literature.   
First, the study is the first to construct a consolidated model that addresses a number 
of constructs related to governmental regulations and outcomes that had only been 
considered separately in previous research [25, 40, 45, 49, 58, 79, 82, 85].  These studies 
had, independently, identified some variables and relationships that may explain a number of 
perceptions, attitudes, and behavior associated with privacy regulation.  In this paper, we 
have looked across these articles to identify components of the shared space in their analyses.   
Second, this paper provides empirical justification for relationships between several 
constructs that had heretofore been untested.  We have tested a model that considers 
relationships between an antecedent variable (regulatory knowledge); a mediating structure 
that encompasses perceived privacy regulation protection, trust, and privacy risk concerns; 
two outcome variables (protection behavior and regulatory preferences); and direct and 
moderating effects associated with perceived rewards.  Although our model does not provide 
an exhaustive test of all antecedents, mediators, and outcome variables [71],  it does stand as 
the first offering to look across that spectrum of relationships by considering some selected 
variables within each domain associated with privacy regulation.    
Third, for four constructs that had been given only limited attention in prior research--
regulatory knowledge, privacy risk concerns, regulatory preferences, and perceived rewards—
this study provides a starting set of measurement scales that can be used by future researchers 
as they delve more deeply into these constructs and their relationships.  While we do not 
claim that our newly developed measures have been subjected to an exhaustive process of 
construct identification and measurement [75, 76], our initial efforts to bound and measure 
these constructs should enlighten researchers who follow with additional studies in this 
domain.    
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 Our findings were generally consistent with our predictions, with only two of our 
hypotheses (H9 and H10) failing to find support.  Those two hypotheses predicted moderating 
effects of perceived rewards on two of the model’s direct relationships (between privacy risk 
concerns and protection behavior and between privacy risk concerns and regulatory 
preferences, respectively). Any moderating influence of perceived rewards is obviously 
swamped by the strong direct relationships between the other constructs. It is clear, however, 
that perceived rewards have strong direct effects on both protection behavior and regulatory 
preferences, which demonstrates its importance in the overall model.  We conclude that the 
role of perceived rewards deserves much additional attention, as we will note below in our 
discussion of future research initiatives.  
 Before turning to a discussion of the implications for research and practice, we first 
highlight some limitations of this study. 
 
6.1 Limitations 
 While this study makes important contributions to the literature, we do note three areas 
that could arguably be considered limitations, and we offer suggestions for ways in which 
future research might take advantage of targeted extensions to our approach. 
 First, the study’s sample – while gathered through an independent data source – is 
based in one country (the UK) and is bounded by the 18-25 year age demographic.  As noted 
earlier, this age group is an ideal one in which to study the phenomena addressed by our 
model.  However, caution must be taken in generalizing the results to other age groups.  One 
obvious extension to increase the study’s generalizability would be to secure a sample across 
a broader domain, especially one that covers subjects across the age spectra. 
 Strictly from the standpoint of generalizability, moving to a multi-country sample may 
not be required as numerous studies have drawn conclusions from single-country samples.  
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However, to the extent that cultural values within a given society may be impacting either the 
constructs or the relationships between them, it would be fruitful to examine those cultural 
impacts.  This would be most readily achieved by comparison of samples (using the same 
instrument and gathered through the same sampling methodology) from several cultures.  At 
the time the data are gathered for the constructs in this study, subjects’ responses to cultural 
value scales (e.g. [34]) could also be elicited.  Such an approach is far preferable to one in 
which it is simply assumed that all members of a certain culture share the same values.  By 
hypothesizing both impacts on the constructs themselves and on their relationships a priori, 
researchers could ascertain which portions (if any) of the model are culturally impacted.   
 Similarly, a multi-country sample would enable the consideration of different 
regulatory models and how they may impact individuals’ perceptions and preferences across 
countries.  As was originally documented by Bennett [8] and later consolidated by Milberg et 
al [49], countries’ regulatory approaches can be largely classified into one of five models, as 
are shown in Figure 3.   
A multi-country sample, if constructed carefully, would allow an additional 
independent variable (regulatory model in a subject’s country) to be tested for its association 
with subjects’ perceptions of regulatory protection.  It is generally assumed by regulators that 
the models on the right-hand side of Figure 3 (which are generally observed in countries 
within the European Union, in Canada, and in some countries in Asia) provide higher levels 
of privacy protection than do those on the left-hand side of Figure 3 (the U.S.-based models).  
These levels of protection, if perceived by individuals within those countries, should be 
associated with individuals’ behavior in privacy-related decision-making, assuming the 
validity of the model that was confirmed in this study.  This extension to this study – which 
would, of course, require a far larger sample drawn from multiple countries – would stand as 
a major contribution to the literature stream. 
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Figure 3 – Regulatory Models 
 
1) The Self-Help model depends on data subjects' challenging recordkeeping practices, by identifying 
perceived problems and bringing them to the courts for resolution.  The United States relies to some 
degree on this model. 
 
2) The Voluntary Control model relies on self-regulation by corporate entities.  Each firm ensures its own 
compliance.  The United States also relies to some degree on this model. 
 
3) The Data Commissioner model creates a governmental institution that embraces the role of an 
ombudsperson.  The commissioner receives complaints and investigates them.  The commissioner 
offers advice and makes proposals regarding legislation; it may also inspect some information 
processing operations.  Germany relies on this model. 
 
4) The Registration model requires that each databank containing personal data be registered (usually 
upon payment of a fee) by a governmental institution (the Registrar).  The Registrar cannot block the 
creation of a particular information system but can “deregister” a system based on a complaint and 
investigation.  The UK relies on this model. 
 
5) The Licensing model requires that each databank containing personal data be licensed (usually, upon 
payment of a fee) by a governmental institution.  This institution would stipulate specific conditions for 
the collection, storage, use, and re-use of personal data.  This model requires prior approval for any re- 
use of data.  Sweden relies on this model. 
 
Sources:  Categories based on [8]. Interpretations based on [8, 49, 69]. See [49] for country classifications. 
 
 
Second, because the data collection for this study was gathered in collaboration with 
the EC, we were unable to dictate the content of the survey, including the wording of the 
measurement items.  All items on the survey were the result of discussion and compromise 
between the authors and the EC.  As a result, we were sometimes constrained in our ability to 
employ scales that – while perhaps not isomorphic to the narrow constructs in our model – 
had previous validation in other studies (e.g., [72]).  The exposure from this limitation is 
modest, however, since previously validated instruments do not exist for many of the 
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constructs in our model, even in tangentially related forms.  Consequently, for those 
constructs for which no validated scales existed, we were forced to develop measurement 
items on our own, with pilot testing and modifications as appropriate.  Although our efforts 
were consistent with those embraced in most studies of this nature, we nevertheless 
recommend that researchers view the items used in this study as a “starting set” for validation. 
The process for full creation and validation of an instrument is a complex one, and it 
involves the bounding of the construct, numerous pilot tests, evaluation for nomological 
validity, etc. (see [75, 76]).  We hope that researchers will embrace the goal of providing 
rigorously validated instruments for these constructs.   
Third, as with the vast majority of previous privacy-related studies, this study shows 
correlation but not causality.  However, the model could be extended to deterring which 
changes in certain constructs cause changes in others. 
To facilitate such findings, laboratory controls and treatments will be required in an 
experimental setting.  For example, an experiment might be designed to expose randomly 
assigned subjects to different scenarios in which their confidence in online domains is 
manipulated.  Additionally, they might receive different treatments that would manipulate 
their perceptions of privacy regulation protection.  Following those manipulations, their levels 
of trust, perceived regulatory protection, privacy risk concerns, and perceived rewards (which 
could be expected to vary based on their treatment) would be measured, and their actual 
behavior could be observed and recorded.  To the extent that differences in these behavioral 
variables were observed across treatment cells, one could reasonably infer that the treatments 
caused the differences in behavior.   
One subtle attribute of such controlled experiments is that, because the subjects are 
assigned randomly to the treatment cells, the sampling mechanism within the population is 
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less critical than it is for a survey study.  Generalizability is gained through the treatment 
protocol rather than through the sampling itself.     
 
6.2 Implications for research 
 In addition to conducting studies that extend sampling to other demographics and 
countries, that further the development of measures, and that include experiments that enable 
inferences about causality (see above), researchers may extend this stream of research in other 
ways. 
 
6.2.1 The roles of perceived rewards and previous experience   
 It is apparent that the construct of perceived rewards has an important effect on some 
of the other constructs in this model.  However, its specific relationship to these constructs 
(and to the relationships between them) deserves additional attention.  Although some of our 
suppositions (direct effects on protection behavior and regulatory preferences) did find 
support, our other suppositions – that perceived rewards would interact with other variables to 
moderate some relationships – did not find support in this study.  This suggests that the cost-
benefit analysis that undergirds the privacy calculus model (e.g., [20]), while not well 
integrated into the overall privacy literature stream (see [71]), provides a fruitful path for 
future research. 
 We suggest that future studies examine the respective roles of both tangible and 
intangible rewards and how they may impact – both directly and indirectly – other variables in 
models such as the one tested in this study.  It is certainly conceivable that different forms of 
perceived rewards might have different direct and moderating influences, and these influences 
might even be contextual, with differing gradations for different types of data (e.g., financial, 
medical, purchase records) or situations. The combinations of such effects may reveal a 
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complex domain with rich research opportunities for the future.   
 Through an exploratory post-hoc analysis, we also found an interesting dichotomy 
between previous online experiences and the strength of some of the relationships in this 
study’s model.  In particular, it appears that some of the relationships in the studied model are 
more robust for “Advanced” than for “Basic” Internet users.  This suggests that future 
researchers could well benefit from including both direct and moderating effects of previous 
experiences in their data collection and modelling efforts.  Note that this concept of previous 
experience is in addition to, and not a substitute for, the concept of prior negative experiences, 
which has occasionally been considered by other researchers (e.g., [58]). 
 
6.2.2 Expanding the model with additional constructs 
 We also reflect once again on the origin of the basic model tested in this study:  
previous studies that considered governmental regulation and outcomes at the individual unit 
of analysis [25, 40, 45, 49, 58, 79, 82, 85].  Our own model (see Figure 1) does not purport to 
represent an exhaustive set of all the variables that had been considered previously, and some 
recent articles that review the broader domain of privacy research [6, 41, 71] reference a very 
large set of over two dozen antecedent constructs and about ten mediating or moderating 
variables, many of which could have an impact on behavior and regulatory preferences.  It is 
obvious that numerous additional combinations of constructs could be considered within this 
same basic model.  Factors such as individual personality traits, previous life experiences, 
one’s cultural indoctrination, and /or one’s exposure to various forms of regulation (see 
above) could serve as antecedents to preferences for regulatory protections.  Also note there 
could be additional moderating variables (in addition to perceived rewards, which we 
considered in H9 and H10) that could moderate those relationships.   
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Of course, no single study could provide an exhaustive set of all the combinations, but 
it remains clear that several years of research studies could be identified in such a super-set, 
and we urge researchers to carefully consider tests of other combinations.  
 
6.2.3 Process model 
 As have almost all the previous studies on privacy-related topics, this study tested a 
variance model.  Variance models explore relationships between higher and lower values 
within certain constructs in a cross-sectional sense.  They do not focus on the passage of time 
or on events that lead to changes of state.   
 Yet another entire domain of research awaits interested researchers:  process models 
of privacy-related behavior.  A largely unexplored domain of research (indeed, only a few 
examples such as [70, 73] exist), process  modelling could provide a rich understanding of the 
changes, over time, that occur in privacy-related relationships.   
 Generally speaking, process modelling requires a long-term research commitment to 
data gathering.  Often through interviews, researchers attempt to clarify the trigger events that 
lead to different states of perception or behavior.  Most often, process modelling is done in an 
organizational context, although it is certainly conceivable that researchers could attempt such 
a study at an individual, dyadic, or small group level. 
 With respect to privacy-related regulatory phenomena, a fruitful process modelling 
initiative might involve an examination of changes in individuals’ levels of trust and their 
perceptions of regulatory protection, risks, and rewards over time.  Additionally, one could 
track changes in their behavior and preferences regarding regulation.  If this were done along 
with a similar tracking process of changes in regulation at the national level (or within the EC, 
at the level of commission-level), rich insights might emerge.  One could envision, for 
example, a long-term interview schedule that allowed a researcher to follow individuals as 
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they experienced changes in privacy regulation along with modifications to commercial 
offerings that had privacy-related attributes.  How the individuals perceived the changes, and 
how their behavior and regulatory preferences changed in response, would reveal deep 
complexities and associations.  
 
6.3 Implications for managerial practice 
 This study’s major contributions are to the privacy research stream, but nevertheless 
there are two implications for practice that should be noted. 
 First, this study makes clear that individuals do not draw privacy-related conclusions 
in isolation:  their approaches to protection behavior and privacy preferences can in some 
measure be predicted based on other constructs.  Thus, managers would be well served to 
consider how their organizational decisions may lead stakeholders to perceive risk and 
rewards.  Although to some degree these perceptions are cumulative – that is, they are not 
necessarily specific to one particular firm or organization – there is some room for managers 
to influence individuals in their behavioral calculations and, even, the extent to which they 
may demand regulatory protections. 
 Second, as was noted earlier, we intentionally recruited a sample of young consumers 
for this study, in light of their high use of digital technologies and their future role as 
decision-makers.  It should therefore be instructive to note that these young people perceive 
real risks in online interactions.  Further, these perceptions manifest themselves in their 
protection behavior and, to some extent, in their regulatory preferences.  This should serve as 
a “call to arms” as we consider these individuals’ reactions as new technologies emerge in 
future decades.   
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6.4 Implications for regulation  
 It is also obvious that this study’s findings can have implications for privacy 
regulation.  Although this study’s sample included subjects from only one country (the UK), 
the strong support for the relationship between perceived privacy regulation protection and 
privacy risk concerns (H4), coupled with the strong support for the consequent relationship 
with protection behavior (H5), suggests that individuals may ultimately feel a reduced need to 
engage in their own protection behavior – which can thwart some commercial initiatives—if 
they become convinced that their countries’ regulatory systems protect them.   
As was shown above (in Figure 3), the UK’s Registration model goes a great distance 
in providing such protection, but an additional model (Licensing) is even more stringent in 
that context.  It might reasonably be conjectured that commercial activities would be more 
efficient if regulatory protections were provided proactively at a systemic level (via 
governmental entities) than left to individuals’ reactive responses.  To the extent that 
commercial entities can know, in advance of offering new products or services, of any 
constraints on their collection, use, and re-use of personal information, this may well be 
preferable to having to respond to individualistic behavioral choices by customers.  Legal 
ambiguity is likely reduced via the more stringent regulatory models in Figure 3, even though 
this may mean that certain data collection and (re-)use practices are restricted.   
 
7. Conclusion  
With data collection increasing at a rapid rate in all industrialized societies, 
individuals’ privacy-related behavior and their regulatory preferences are becoming subjects 
of increasing interest to marketers, policy-makers, and many other societal stakeholders.  It is 
heartening that the privacy research stream has grown over the past few years and that some 
attempts are now being made to consolidate disparate findings into overarching models. 
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In this study, we have tested a model that incorporates some of the relevant constructs 
associated with privacy regulation that have been posited to explain privacy-related behavior 
and regulatory preferences.  This study should be seen not as an exhaustive test of a macro-
model but, rather, as one step on a long path of research initiatives that will yield additional 
understanding over time in this important domain.  We hope that other researchers will join us 
in future research initiatives that unpack these complex relationships.  
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Appendix 1. Tests for non-response bias 
T-tests of mean differences for first and fourth quartile responses 
Construct         
(see Table 5) 
Mean differences 
(1st and 4th 
quartiles – 
earliest and latest 
responses)  
Standard 
error 
t-value Significance 
(two-tailed) 
PRP -.23304 .12430 -1.875 P < .10 
TR .12425 .10605 1.172 n.s. 
TC .07227 .09128 .792 n.s. 
DT -.22294 .02475 -9.009 P < .01 
ID .10216 .06479 1.577 n.s. 
UR .10292 .07711 1. 335 n.s. 
HR -.08735 .07633 -1.144 n.s. 
TP .03711 .07129 .521 n.s. 
GC .12361 .06808 1.816 P < .10 
WI .02814 .05797 .485 n.s. 
RP .04502 .05264 .855 n.s. 
Age -.267 .211 -1.267 n.s. 
 
Chi-square Test for gender 
% male 1st quartile 
(earliest responses) 
% male 4th quartile 
(last responses) 
Chi-square 
(Pearson) 
Significance       
(two-tailed) 
49.5% 50.5% .089 n.s. 
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Appendix 2. Test for Common Method Bias (CMB) 
 
Construct Indicator 
Item Factor 
Loadings 
Variance 
explained by 
the Factors 
Method 
Factor 
Loadings 
Variance 
explained by 
the Methods 
Regulatory 
Knowledge 
RK 1 1.000 0.154 0.024 
Perceived 
Regulatory 
Protection 
PRP1 0.772 0.596 -0.404 0.163 
PRP2 0.837 0.701 -0.227 0.052 
PRP3 0.877 0.769 -0.269 0.072 
PRP4 0.824 0.679 -0.29 0.084 
PRP5 0.871 0.759 -0.268 0.072 
PRP6 0.859 0.738 -0.257 0.066 
Trust in 
Regulators 
TR1 0.908 0.824 -0.271 0.073 
TR2 0.951 0.904 -0.251 0.063 
TR3 0.932 0.869 -0.236 0.056 
Trust in 
Companies 
TC1 0.952 0.906 -0.287 0.082 
TC2 0.952 0.906 -0.248 0.062 
Data Tracking 
Concerns 
DTC1 0.813 0.661 0.212 0.045 
DTC2 0.897 0.805 0.239 0.057 
DTC3 0.899 0.808 0.233 0.054 
DTC4 0.813 0.661 0.29 0.084 
DTC5 0.805 0.648 0.293 0.086 
DTC6 0.855 0.731 0.268 0.072 
Identity 
Damage 
Concerns 
IDC1 0.835 0.697 0.241 0.058 
IDC2 0.846 0.716 0.225 0.051 
IDC3 0.891 0.794 0.209 0.044 
IDC4 0.866 0.750 0.294 0.086 
IDC5 0.852 0.726 0.291 0.085 
Utilitarian 
Rewards 
UR1 0.732 0.536 -0.268 0.072 
UR2 0.714 0.510 -0.232 0.054 
UR3 0.807 0.651 -0.256 0.066 
UR4 0.854 0.729 -0.261 0.068 
UR5 0.838 0.702 -0.221 0.049 
Hedonic 
Rewards 
HR1 0.843 0.711 -0.216 0.047 
HR2 0.904 0.817 -0.229 0.052 
HR3 0.888 0.789 -0.239 0.057 
HR4 0.752 0.566 -0.367 0.135 
Technical 
Protection 
TP1 0.835 0.697 0.24 0.058 
TP2 0.832 0.692 0.249 0.062 
TP3 0.704 0.496 0.298 0.089 
TP4 0.726 0.527 0.222 0.049 
TP5 0.769 0.591 0.224 0.050 
TP6 0.742 0.551 0.212 0.045 
TP7 0.82 0.672 0.259 0.067 
General 
Caution 
GC1 0.888 0.789 0.284 0.081 
GC2 0.888 0.789 0.313 0.098 
Withholding 
W1 0.818 0.669 0.347 0.120 
W2 0.82 0.672 0.298 0.089 
Regulatory 
Preferences 
RP1 0.809 0.654 0.162 0.026 
RP2 0.791 0.626 0.124 0.015 
RP3 0.61 0.372 0.018 0.000 
RP4 0.781 0.610 0.116 0.013 
RP5 0.772 0.596 0.072 0.005 
AVERAGE 
 
0.834 0.701 0.023 0.064 
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Appendix 3. Survey items and statistics 
 
 
 Perceived Regulatory Protection (PRP) 
For each of the following statements. please state if you tend to agree or not Scale Mean SD 
In UK, my personal data are properly protected 1 – 7 3.57 1.638 
UK legislation can cope with the growing number of people leaving personal 
information on the Internet 
1 – 7 3.05 1.569 
I believe that the systems used by the public authorities to manage the citizens' 
personal data are technically secure. 
1 – 7 3.09 1.635 
I believe citizens will be able to keep a good level of control over their personal 
data 
1 – 7 3.29 1.581 
I will always be able to rely on public authorities for help if problems arise 
with my personal data 
1 – 7 2.97 1.628 
I believe that the authorities that manage my personal data are 
professional and competent 
1 - 7 3.09 1.652 
 
 
 Trust in Regulators (TR) 
Overall, how much do you trust the following institutions to handle your personal 
information safely? Scale 
Mean SD 
The national Government 1 – 5 3.47 1.297 
The European Union 1 – 5 3.47 1.271 
The Local Council 1 – 5 3.32 1.204 
 
 Trust in Companies (TC) 
Overall, how much do you trust the following entities to handle your personal 
information safely? Scale 
Mean SD 
A company I am familiar with 1 – 5 2.80 1.121 
A well-known company 1 - 5 2.96 1.169 
An unknown company (removed) (reversed) 1 - 5 3.24 .949 
 
 
 Data Tracking Concerns (DT) 
How concerned are you about the following risks in relation to your personal data Scale Mean SD 
Companies possess information about me that I consider private 1 - 5 1.86 .905 
My personal information is used without my knowledge 1 – 5 1.67 .897 
My online personal data is used to send me commercial offers 1 – 5 1.64 .897 
My behavior and activities can be monitored online 1 – 5 1.92 .983 
My identity is reconstructed using personal data from various sources 1 – 5 1.79 .952 
My personal data is shared with third parties without my agreement 1 - 5 1.64 .897 
 
 
   
 Identity Damage Concerns (ID)  
How concerned are you about the following risks in relation to your personal data Scale Mean SD 
My reputation may be damaged by online personal information 1 – 5 2.11 1.068 
My personal safety may be at risk due to online personal information 1 – 5 2.05 1.073 
My identity is at risk of theft online 1 – 5 1.72 .896 
My views and behavior may be misrepresented based on online personal 
information 
1 – 5 2.01 .979 
I may be victim of financial fraud online 1 - 5 1.74 .947 
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 Utilitarian Rewards (UR) 
How likely are you to provide personal data for the following reasons? Scale Mean SD 
To save time (not to type information several times for instance) 1 - 5 3.32 1.219 
To benefit from a better service (e.g. Education, health, etc) 1 – 5 3.55 1.049 
To benefit from personalized commercial offers 1 – 5 2.96 1.173 
To receive gifts or samples 1 – 5 3.07 1.195 
To receive money or price reductions 1 – 5 3.24 1.183 
To log on securely onto a system (removed) 1 - 5 3.94 1.151 
    
 Hedonic Rewards (HR)  
How likely are you to provide personal data for the following reasons? Scale Mean SD 
To receive valuable information 1 – 5 3.57 1.038 
To enjoy, to take pleasure 1 – 5 3.24 1.096 
To make a good action, to help 1 – 5 3.30 1.086 
To connect with others 1 – 5 3.50 1.111 
 
 
 Technical Protection (TP) 
I usually protect my personal data and identity in the following ways Scale Mean SD 
Scan data with anti-spy ware 1 – 4 3.09 .997 
Update virus protection 1 – 4 3.26 .929 
Install operating system patches 1 - 4 2.54 1.172 
Use tools limiting the collection of personal data from my computer (e.g. 
firewall, cookie filtering) 
1 – 4 2.94 1.018 
Erase cookies 1 – 4 2.68 1.022 
Use tools and strategies to limit unwanted email 1 – 4 2.92 .977 
Check that the transaction is protected or the site has a safety badge before I 
enter valuable personal data 
1 – 4 3.05 .986 
    
 General Caution (GC) 
Adapt my personal data so that no linking between profiles is possible 1 – 4 2.24 1.019 
Read the privacy policy of web sites 1 – 4 2.26 .915 
Change the security settings of my browser to increase privacy (removed) 1 - 4 2.43 1.002 
 
 Withholding (WI) 
Give a minimum of information 1 - 4 2.76 .823 
Do not give personal details 1 - 4 2.38 .781 
 
 
 Regulatory Preferences (RP) 
What do you think are the efficient ways to protect your identity and privacy Scale Mean SD 
Give users more direct control on their own identity data 1 - 4 2.92 .756 
Allocate more resources to monitoring and enforcing existing regulations 1 - 4 2.98 .757 
Require that service providers take greater care of their customer's identity 1 - 4 3.21 .803 
Provide formal education on safe identity management 1 – 4 3.00 .788 
Set up clear guidelines for safe identity management, online and offline 1 - 4 3.14 .758 
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 Internet activities (used in post-hoc analysis) 
Do you do the following activities on the Internet?  (Tick all that apply.) Percentage ticked 
Check email (B)10 80% 
Instant messaging (A) 65% 
Participate in chat rooms, newsgroups or an online discussion forum (A) 30% 
 Use a search engine to find information (B) 93% 
Use website (flicker, Youtube, etc.) to share pictures, videos, movies etc. (A) 50% 
Manage your profile on a social networking site such as Youtube, myspace, or Facebook 
(A) 
54% 
Keep a web-log (or what is called a blog) (A) 8% 
Use peer-to-peer software to exchange movies, music, etc. (A) 17% 
                                                 
10 (B) denotes a “basic” task; (A) denotes an “advanced” task. 
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Appendix 4. Outer loadings 
 
Item Loading St Dev. T Statistics 
PRP1 0.763 0.021 36.943 
PRP2 0.833 0.015 54.011 
PRP3 0.881 0.010 84.579 
PRP4 0.818 0.016 52.151 
PRP5 0.877 0.011 80.779 
PRP6 0.866 0.011 75.382 
TR1 0.910 0.008 114.122 
TR2 0.951 0.005 200.831 
TR3 0.931 0.008 122.682 
TC1 0.952 0.005 182.823 
TC2 0.951 0.006 171.642 
DTC1 0.815 0.018 44.339 
DTC2 0.898 0.009 100.680 
DTC3 0.898 0.008 107.645 
DTC4 0.812 0.018 45.119 
DTC5 0.802 0.020 40.685 
DTC6 0.857 0.013 66.711 
IDC1 0.833 0.014 60.081 
IDC2 0.842 0.014 59.371 
IDC3 0.894 0.009 103.944 
IDC4 0.864 0.012 74.449 
IDC5 0.856 0.014 62.269 
UR1 0.749 0.019 39.318 
UR2 0.739 0.019 39.934 
UR3 0.797 0.014 56.409 
UR4 0.837 0.012 72.418 
UR5 0.824 0.014 59.206 
HR1 0.844 0.013 62.545 
HR2 0.902 0.008 109.551 
HR3 0.886 0.009 99.141 
HR4 0.756 0.020 37.604 
TP1 0.830 0.012 68.777 
TP2 0.827 0.013 65.624 
TP3 0.705 0.017 40.510 
TP4 0.726 0.018 39.480 
TP5 0.772 0.015 50.082 
TP6 0.746 0.019 40.158 
TP7 0.822 0.013 62.934 
GC1 0.871 0.011 81.879 
GC2 0.905 0.006 156.396 
W1 0.829 0.023 36.348 
W2 0.809 0.024 33.393 
RP1 0.814 0.020 41.033 
RP2 0.794 0.019 41.652 
RP3 0.612 0.041 14.881 
RP4 0.782 0.020 39.361 
RP5 0.762 0.023 32.919 
 
56 
Appendix 5. Loadings and Cross-Loadings 
 
Regulatory 
Knowledge
Perceived 
Regulatory 
Protection
Trust in 
Regulators
Trust in 
Companies
Data 
Tracking 
Risks
Identity 
Damage 
Risks
Utilitarian 
Rewards
Hedonic 
Rewards
Technical 
Protection
General 
Caution
Withholding
Regulatory 
Preferences
Regulatory 
Knowledge
RK 1.000 0.071 -0.038 -0.044 0.130 0.087 -0.056 0.009 0.321 0.216 0.144 0.048
PRP1 0.170 0.763 0.317 0.279 -0.172 -0.165 0.204 0.202 0.081 0.029 -0.069 0.037
PRP2 0.055 0.833 0.327 0.271 -0.278 -0.248 0.241 0.196 -0.088 0.019 -0.106 -0.052
PRP3 0.031 0.881 0.427 0.296 -0.289 -0.240 0.252 0.214 -0.114 -0.015 -0.112 -0.052
PRP4 0.069 0.818 0.319 0.287 -0.239 -0.175 0.270 0.238 -0.044 0.073 -0.091 0.011
PRP5 0.035 0.877 0.418 0.290 -0.292 -0.238 0.272 0.230 -0.104 0.033 -0.118 -0.039
PRP6 0.025 0.866 0.434 0.299 -0.282 -0.214 0.261 0.241 -0.107 0.037 -0.080 -0.020
TR1 -0.048 0.403 0.910 0.522 -0.241 -0.184 0.365 0.305 -0.208 -0.121 -0.194 0.027
TR2 -0.043 0.445 0.951 0.493 -0.202 -0.138 0.344 0.298 -0.194 -0.094 -0.196 0.069
TR3 -0.013 0.405 0.931 0.462 -0.215 -0.158 0.310 0.313 -0.174 -0.083 -0.196 0.054
TC1 -0.048 0.340 0.511 0.952 -0.166 -0.119 0.391 0.356 -0.141 -0.129 -0.167 0.099
TC2 -0.035 0.309 0.498 0.951 -0.153 -0.092 0.360 0.341 -0.113 -0.114 -0.108 0.100
DT1 0.076 -0.280 -0.225 -0.165 0.815 0.656 -0.109 -0.050 0.169 0.137 0.125 0.199
DT2 0.144 -0.261 -0.188 -0.123 0.898 0.702 -0.090 -0.018 0.212 0.102 0.183 0.218
DT3 0.139 -0.253 -0.174 -0.116 0.898 0.673 -0.108 -0.001 0.237 0.068 0.186 0.222
DT4 0.080 -0.236 -0.214 -0.137 0.812 0.621 -0.118 -0.036 0.189 0.084 0.165 0.166
DT5 0.094 -0.255 -0.176 -0.134 0.802 0.575 -0.178 -0.055 0.202 0.117 0.147 0.160
DT6 0.125 -0.297 -0.222 -0.179 0.857 0.711 -0.125 -0.045 0.255 0.106 0.183 0.205
ID1 0.071 -0.218 -0.153 -0.130 0.660 0.833 -0.022 0.018 0.147 0.129 0.080 0.138
ID2 0.030 -0.247 -0.161 -0.096 0.596 0.842 -0.016 0.020 0.147 0.121 0.078 0.101
ID3 0.101 -0.250 -0.163 -0.090 0.725 0.894 -0.040 -0.010 0.211 0.092 0.160 0.201
ID4 0.053 -0.166 -0.098 -0.085 0.617 0.864 0.021 0.024 0.115 0.133 0.079 0.160
ID5 0.110 -0.216 -0.161 -0.078 0.721 0.856 -0.036 0.008 0.235 0.095 0.150 0.198
UR1 -0.047 0.225 0.294 0.274 -0.144 -0.064 0.749 0.617 -0.229 -0.176 -0.207 0.141
UR2 -0.006 0.230 0.340 0.350 -0.062 -0.015 0.739 0.715 -0.156 -0.145 -0.172 0.207
UR3 -0.046 0.228 0.276 0.293 -0.145 -0.022 0.797 0.580 -0.201 -0.073 -0.267 0.046
UR4 -0.083 0.259 0.279 0.308 -0.121 0.000 0.837 0.569 -0.205 -0.125 -0.241 0.036
UR5 -0.043 0.234 0.249 0.329 -0.089 0.011 0.824 0.559 -0.162 -0.139 -0.175 0.047
HR1 0.021 0.227 0.300 0.340 -0.030 0.019 0.671 0.844 -0.159 -0.177 -0.189 0.188
HR2 -0.002 0.217 0.250 0.290 -0.028 0.003 0.674 0.902 -0.204 -0.145 -0.241 0.124
HR3 0.027 0.237 0.318 0.321 -0.057 -0.025 0.656 0.886 -0.150 -0.101 -0.217 0.179
HR4 -0.019 0.207 0.243 0.292 -0.016 0.054 0.619 0.756 -0.157 -0.102 -0.244 0.125
TP1 0.224 -0.061 -0.163 -0.066 0.233 0.204 -0.169 -0.129 0.830 0.387 0.276 0.112
TP2 0.238 -0.081 -0.162 -0.077 0.237 0.202 -0.168 -0.157 0.827 0.396 0.259 0.136
TP3 0.232 -0.025 -0.108 -0.088 0.075 0.066 -0.119 -0.112 0.705 0.453 0.232 0.088
TP4 0.211 -0.096 -0.171 -0.131 0.205 0.164 -0.198 -0.159 0.726 0.432 0.221 0.088
TP5 0.276 -0.080 -0.154 -0.083 0.197 0.162 -0.195 -0.154 0.772 0.447 0.313 0.143
TP6 0.290 -0.040 -0.163 -0.142 0.188 0.143 -0.219 -0.167 0.746 0.502 0.273 0.097
TP7 0.273 -0.062 -0.197 -0.140 0.208 0.148 -0.238 -0.190 0.822 0.555 0.318 0.090
GC1 0.178 0.046 -0.103 -0.122 0.115 0.138 -0.130 -0.123 0.460 0.871 0.239 0.081
GC2 0.203 0.014 -0.088 -0.106 0.100 0.100 -0.164 -0.151 0.570 0.905 0.278 0.070
W1 0.123 -0.114 -0.172 -0.109 0.201 0.150 -0.198 -0.175 0.303 0.228 0.829 0.071
W2 0.113 -0.073 -0.172 -0.129 0.117 0.060 -0.243 -0.255 0.269 0.252 0.809 0.008
RP1 0.047 -0.061 0.045 0.070 0.224 0.166 -0.077 -0.137 0.176 0.087 0.072 0.814
RP2 0.031 -0.040 0.024 0.047 0.194 0.152 -0.083 -0.141 0.095 0.079 0.034 0.794
RP3 0.021 0.016 0.043 0.069 0.098 0.089 -0.134 -0.141 0.016 0.087 -0.001 0.612
RP4 0.090 -0.010 0.039 0.110 0.193 0.152 -0.073 -0.146 0.140 0.028 0.034 0.782
RP5 -0.019 0.009 0.055 0.103 0.147 0.142 -0.110 -0.126 0.074 0.043 0.039 0.762
Utilitarian 
Rewards
Perceived 
Regulatory 
Protection
Trust in 
Regulators
Trust in 
Companies
Data 
Tracking 
Risks
Identity 
Damage 
Risks
Hedonic 
Rewards
Technical 
Protection
General 
Caution
Withholding
Regulatory 
Preferences
 
